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SUMMARY OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT 
The Appellee contends that, regarding the five issue presented by the Appellant, 
that he failed to marshal the evidence and therefore, his appeal must fail. 
This responsive Brief addresses that argument. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
The Appellee cites to Oneida /SLC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehousi 
872 P.2d 1052 (Utah App. 1994) and states that the burden of marshaling evidenc 
is on the Appellant. 
That is correct. In Oneida the Utah Court of Appeals stated that an 
Appellant cannot present "carefully selected" facts. Additionally, the Utah Court 
of appeals set forth a two-tier test and stated that "Successful challenges to the 
findings of fact thus must demonstrate to appellate courts first how the trial court 
found the facts from the evidence and second why such findings contradict the 
weight of the evidence." Id. At 1053. 
The Appellant believes that he did marshal the evidence. He set forth both 
"how" the trial found the facts and then he stated "why" the findings contradict th 
weight of the evidence. 
This reply Brief shall rebut the assertion that the Appellant did not 
marshal. 
ISSUE 1 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by assuming that Paragraph 13 of 
Decree of Divorce included stock options that had not yet been awarded to the 
Appellant at the time of the Decree of Divorce? 
The first issue presented in the brief of Appellant was regarding paragn 
13 of the Decree of Divorce., which states "The Respondent has qualified for 
certain stock options through his place of employment, Novell, Inc. The Petitio 
is awarded twenty-five percent (25%) of said stock options that the respondent 
acquired, or is entitled to, or which he has acquired all rights in through his pla 
of employment which have accumulated as of the date of this Stipulation." 
The stipulation was signed by the parties on November 11, 1997. 
Therefore, the Decree, at paragraph 13, limits the division of stock optic 
to those that existed on November 11, 1999. 
Appellant contended that court abused its discretion when it awarded 
a judgment to Elizabeth Andrus for stocks that did not exist on November 11, 
1999. 
HOW: In his Brief, the Appellant set forth how the trial court awarded 1 
judgment to Elizabeth Andrus. 
The evidence marshaled was the cite to CR1573; lines 7-9. The trial coi 
found that the parties "anticipated" that there would be 55,400 share of stock to 
divide. 
HOW: At trial there was one piece of evidence that contained the number 
"55,400." Appellant marshaled the evidence in his brief, with his "Addendum F" 
which he identified as "Exhibit 1, tab O." That document was a copy of an e-mail 
which Daniel Andrus sent to Elizabeth Andrus' family members, "Alva and 
Jared." Exhibit 1, tab O was a document that was never sent to Elizabeth Andrus. 
It was admitted at trial. Although Mr. Andrus did not believe that it was relevant 
because it was not even sent to Elizabeth Andrus and the document was inaccuratt 
and also inadmissable because it was the product of negotiations, it was used by 
the Court as the basis for the determination of the number of stock options. 
Because the Court used the document and relied on the document, it was 
marshaled by Daniel Andrus. 
The Appellant had no other document to produce in his appeal as evidence 
that the Court relied upon. Pursuant to Oneida, at page 1053, Mr. Andrus was 
obligated to present "every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists." 
The Appellee's brief at page 7 acknowledges that Appellant did marshal 
exhibit lo . However, she contends that exhibits "lm or Ik" were not marshaled 
and she implies that the two pieces of evidence support the ruling of the trial court 
But, the Appellee does not attach the exhibits to her brief, nor does not say how 
the exhibits she cites support the Court's rulings. 
Exhibit 1L is a letter written by attorney Guy Black and it discusses the 
9,000 shares of stock that Mrs. Andrus was paid for. It does not discuss the 
55,400 shares. See attachment A of this brief. 
Exhibit 1L address stocks that were later exchanged and blacked out. Th 
date of the document is July 15, 1997. The exhibits cited by Appellee are not 
relevant to any decision made by the Court because the written stipulation and 
Decree of Divorce refer to stock that existed on November 11, 1997, which was 
the date the Stipulation was signed. Any stock that existed months prior to the 
date of November 11, 1999 were, pursuant to the terms of the parties written 
stipulation, not relevant. See attachment B of this brief. 
Both exhibits are attached to this responsive brief. But neither exhibit 
could have been one which the trial court relied upon because the letter does nc 
mention the number 55,400 shares and the other document is dated and signed 
months before the November 11, 1999 date the parties stipulation was effective 
Appellant marshaled evidence regarding the date the stipulation was sigi 
and marshaled a letter from Novel setting forth the number of shares that existe 
on the date the stipulation was signed. 
Dan Andrus did not agree with the trial court that there were 55,400 sha 
of stock available to divide at the date of November 11, 1999. However, the 
Appellant did marshal the evidence in that regard. It was the only evidence 
submitted with the the number of shares the trial court addressed at trial. 
HOW: The Decree of Divorce, at paragraph 13 did not set forth a number 
of stock options which should be divided by the parties. The only document that 
was produced at trial that contained the number 55,400 was marshaled by the 
Appellant.. 
WHY: In his brief, the Appellant cited "why" the findings contradict the 
weight of the evidence and in doing that he attached two documents to his brief. 
The first evidence cited was Addendum G, (which was exhibit number 31, 
attachment 1) which was a letter from the Novell Director os Shareholder Service: 
who wrote Daniel Andrus a letter dated May 10, 2004 and it stated "In reference t 
your stock options as of November, 1997; You had only 9,000 options that were 
exercisable. All other option that you held in November 1997 were in a black-out 
period and unexercisable due to the terms under the repriced program." 
On November 11, 1999 there were 9,000 stock options in existence and 
Daniel Andrus marshaled any and all evidence presented at trial that verified that 
fact. 
In addition, the Appellant attached Petitioner's exhibit 20, as addendum H, 
which set forth the Stock Option History. The marshaling of "evidence" both as 
to How and Why was accomplished by Mr. Andrus and attached to his brief. The 
Utah Court of Appeals need not look or search for any additional evidence in th 
file because the evidence that supported the Courts findings were attached as w« 
as the evidence that disputed the trail Court's findings. It is true that the Appell 
need not search for the evidence and provide it . The marshaling was done by tt 
Appellant. 
ISSUE TWO 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it created a method to assi 
a value to the stock options which were then awarded to the Appellee? 
The Appellant explained, in his brief, that the trial court found that the 
value of the stock should be determined by taking the average value of the stocl 
nine different time that Mrs. Andrus had requested the stock options. 
HOW: Regarding evidence which supported the trial court's valuation c 
the stock options, Daniel Andrus attached the evidence which supported the bai 
for the trial court's valuation of the stocks. See Appellant's brief, addendum I, 
which was Elizabeth Andrus submission of exhibit 21. Daniel Andrus also 
submitted in his brief, Addendum H, which was the exhibit 20, submitted by 
Elizabeth Andrus, which was the list of the stock option personal summary. 
The Appellant attached to his brief, Addendum B, which was the writter 
stipulation signed by both Elizabeth and Daniel Andrus, on November 11, 199' 
The Annellant noted in his brief, that the award of stock options to 
Elizabeth Andrus was the number that had accumulated "as of the date of this 
stipulation." See addendum B, paragraph 14. 
The Appellant did not contend that the court came up with the values for 
stocks from the air. The Appellant stated in his brief that Elizabeth Andrus 
testified that she asked for the stock options at different times and the Court founc 
that it should average the value of the stocks at various times. The Court was 
provided with exhibit number 21, as a tool to value the stock options. Daniel 
Andrus cited to the exhibit and attached it when he accomplished the marshaling 
as to the issue of stock valuation. 
The Appellant agrees with the Appellee that paragraph 37 of the Findings 
of the trial Court provides (amount other things) that "the Decree [of Divorce] 
specified 55,400 shares, 9000 of which were divided." 
However, neither the written stipulation, which was signed on November 
11, 1999, nor the resulting Decree of Divorce contained the language that the tria 
court stated it did. 
No amount of marshaling can support a finding that does not exist or 
provide rationale to language that is not contained in the court documents. The 
number "55,400 shares" [of stock] is not in the written, signed stipulation and it is 
not in the Decree of Divorce. Any document that referred, or even mentioned, 
that number was marshaled and discussed by Daniel Andrus. 
Daniel Andrus also marshaled the evidence, when he attached Addendur 
E, which was the Decree of Divorce at paragraph 13 that dealt with stocks. The 
is no number "55,400" in the Divorce Decree, as the trial court stated in it's 
findings, at paragraph 37. 
There is no marshaling that can accomplish prove a fact that does not ex 
ISSUE THREE 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it chose to apply Paragraph < 
the Decree of Divorce, when the issue of Alimony had been reserved for trial? 
Paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce, attached to the brief of Daniel 
Andrus states; "The Court finds that it is anticipated that the Petitioner may obt 
employment outside the home. In the even she should obtain full time 
employment, the same shall not affect the amount of child support or alimony t 
be paid by the respondent to the petitioner." 
HOW: The evidence marshaled was noted in the brief of Daniel Andrus 
page 24, where he referred to the CR:1682, line 1 paragraph 15, where the coui 
noted "As noted above the parties stipulated and agreed that the Petitioner's ou 
the home income would not be considered in determining spouse support." 
The basis of the Court's ruling was the reliance on that portion of the Decree al 
paragraph 6. That was the entirety of the Court refusal to consider the Petitione 
income when calculating alimony and child support. 
The marshaling that was necessary was to find out what evidence the co 
relied upon and say so. The Appellant marshaled the information necessary for 
the Utah Court of Appeals to understand the basis for the Court's ruling. 
Daniel Andrus marshaled the findings and evidence that the Court found 
that the parties written stipulation, and paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce, was 
the basis of the award. 
Daniel Andrus then marshaled, attached and discussed the written 
stipulation and it's application by the Court to the issue of alimony. 
WHY: Also marshaled was the original ruling by Judge Ray M. Harding Jr 
where at CR: 0129, this document was attached as Addendum K, to the brief of 
Daniel Andrus. The ruling of the Court stated that "Respondent is entitled to reliel 
from the stipulation and the Divorce Decree in regards to alimony and child 
support provisions which were calculated from the mistaken income figures. 
Therefore, the Court finds that justice would be furthered by relieving the 
Respondent from his stipulation on the provisions of alimony and child support 
only.55 
Daniel Andrus also marshaled and attached Addendum L, which was page: 
from the Affidavit of Daniel Andrus in Support of his Motion to Set Aside the 
Decree of Divorce, wherein at paragraph 9 that the original stipulation and 
resulting Decree of Divorce was based upon a misunderstanding by Daniel Andruj 
regarding the impact his (then) wife's income would have on his child support 
obligation. 
Regarding the issue of marshaling to the discussion of alimony, there are 
two basic documents that were presented as evidence to the trial court. The first 
paragraph 6, which was not set aside and it was attached in the brief of Daniel 
Andrus. The second piece of evidence was the ruling of Judge Ray Harding, Jr. 
which was attached in the brief of Daniel Andrus. 
The Appellee implies that Daniel Andrus attempted to reargue the case. { 
Appellee's brief at page 12, "this is not a forum for reargument of this case." 
Appellant never tried to reargue the case in his brief. He stated what evidence 
supported the trial court and then Dan Andrus set forth why the court's findings 
contradict the evidence. Dan Andrus marshaled the evidence, regarding prior cc 
rulings and orders. He then cited to case law that supported the long held 
contention that the actual income of Elizabeth should not have been ignored by 
Court. 
Paragraph 18 of the Findings of the trial court find: "Although her incon 
will not be used as part of these calculations the Petitioner is employed and 
employable." Daniel Andrus did not disagree with the fact that the Petitioner is 
employed and is employable. 
The argument of Daniel Andrus was that the finding by the trial court th 
the income of Elizabeth Andrus would not be considered for the purposes of 
alimony and child support was not supported by the evidence he presented and 
marshaled, via attachments to his brief. When Daniel Andrus cited to prior 
rulings of the Court and attached the evidence he relied upon. He also cited to the 
court record that would support the Court's decision on that issue. The evidence 
that supports the Court's ruling was paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce and the 
evidence that supported the Appellants position was marshaled and attached, as 
previously discussed above. 
ISSUE FOUR 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it failed to consider the 
Respondent's tax obligations, and as a result did not correctly compute his net 
available income in determining Alimony? 
HOW: Daniel Andrus had very little evidence that he could marshal 
regarding the Court's ignoring the tax obligations of the Appellant. The Court did 
not even consider the net income of Daniel Andrus. 
The Court acknowledged that it used the gross income of Daniel Andrus in 
it's findings, where at paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact (CR: 1683) state "the 
Respondent's unchallenged position is that gross income for 2005 and in the 
future should be considered as $10,000.00 per month." Therefore, there was no 
evidence that could be marshaled regarding a stipulated fact. 
It was a gross income that, as the court stated, was stipulated by the parties 
and adopted by the trial court. Because the stipulation of the parties was adopte 
by the trial court, there is no evidence to marshal that would require additional 
support. The Court correctly stated that stipulation. There is nothing to marshal 
that would dispute or disprove that fact. 
WHY: Daniel Andrus marshaled all the evidence that indicated that the 
trial court's analysis failed to consider the weight of the evidence. The Appellar 
cited and marshaled testimony - even from Elizabeth Andrus - that verified the 1 
implications for Daniel Andrus on his gross income of $10,000.00 per month. 
The evidence marshaled in that regard was as follows; 
Daniel Andrus cited to the trial transcript, pages 35, 155, 272, 276, 411. 
Specifically Daniel Andrus marshaled that Ms. Andrus testified to the 
amount of income taxes Daniel pays each month during direct examination (tria 
transcript, page 35): 
MR. YOUNG: Now, does [Daniel's] paycheck show a net after tax figure? 
MS. ANDRUS: Well, you take out the taxes, which total $3,410. So it gives hii 
net after taxes, $6,558. 
Daniel Andrus cited to Exhibit 33, as submitted by Daniel Andrus also si 
forth the monthly tax obligations of Daniel Andrus, which he attached in his bri 
as Addendum J, which indicates that Daniel spends a minimum of $2,599.00 pe 
month in taxes. 
The trial court conducted a very simple analysis, regarding the ability of 
Daniel Andrus to pay alimony, wherein at paragraph 29 of the Findings, the trial 
court found that Daniel's expenses should be considered to be $6,499.00. The 
trial court arrived at that figure by allowing for $1,500.00 per month for housing, 
$500.00 for food, $1,400.00 for child support, $316.00 for auto payments and 
allowed $2,783.00 for all other misc. expenses for a total of $6,499.00 per month. 
The trial court's findings at paragraph 30 then deducted the monthly expenses 
from the gross income of $10,000.00. 
Assuming that the Findings of the trial court are correct and that when it 
found that the monthly expenses of Daniel Andrus were $6,499.00 (no challenge 
has been made to that finding) and assuming that the trial court was correct when 
it found, at paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact (CR: 1683) that "the Respondent9 
unchallenged position is that gross income for 2005 and in the future should be 
considered as $10,000.00 per month., then it cannot be also be accurate and true 
that Daniel Andrus has $3,150.00 available to pay alimony . 
Without attempting to reargue the case, Daniel Andrus marshaled the only 
evidence available in the case, which was the findings of gross income, that were 
the result of the stipulation of the parties and the court's analysis of the money 
available to pay alimony. 
ISSUE FIVE 
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ordered the Appellant to p; 
the Appellee's attorney fees, after attempting to divide disposable income equal 
The Appellant asked the question regarding the evidence which supported the 
award of attorney's fees to Elizabeth Andrus. In addressing that issue the 
Appellant contended that the "[T]he trial court must base [an award of attorney' 
fees] on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's 
ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees." and cited to Kelle 
v. Kelley. 2000 UT App 236, f 30, 9 P.3d 171. 
HOW: Daniel Andrus marshaled the evidence that supported the court's 
award of alimony. He marshaled the following: 
1. the statutory language of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (8)(a). 
2. The court assessed Daniel's gross income, calculated his disposable income a 
found that he had enough "disposable income" per month. 
3. The Court found that Elizabeth Andrus is without substantial cash. 
Daniel Andrus did not ignore the findings or the evidence that supported the 
findings of the court. He cited to the findings and then attempted to address his 
issues. 
WHY: Daniel disputed what the court considered to be his disposable 
income and cited to the evidence that rebutted that - which was once again the 
ignoring of the tax obligations of Daniel Andrus. 
Daniel marshaled the findings by the court that Elizabeth is without 
substantial cash and marshaled and tried to support his argument that he did not 
have any substantial cash either. He cited that an examination of the evidence and 
testimony contains no proof that he has any cash holdings. 
Daniel marshaled and cited to the trial court record CR: 1681. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence was properly marshaled. The first evidence marshaled by 
Daniel Andrus was regarding the evidence that supported how the trial court foun 
the facts from the evidence and second part of the evidence marshaled by Daniel 
Andrus was regarding why such findings contradict the weight of the evidence. 
Dated and signed this of February 2007. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
)sprnona Blakelock 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this 22 day of February 2007,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing responsive brief, to: 
Brent Young, 226, West 2230 North, Suite 210, Provo, Utah 84603 

ADDENDUM A 
J*** 
f/fcER & HARRIS 
199 W &RJDOES" 
pwifthtE-Bdor row 
JsredM. Harm * BLACKPOOT, ID 
- Abe AA«*»d 1*1*4. Telephone (20g) 7SJ 
Fa»aik(2Ml)7«5 
E«M*ii — rabmi*w@s 
November 9, 1999 
GuyL Black 
Greenwood & Black 
1S40 North State Street 
Provo, Utsh 84604 
Re: Andrus v. Andrus 
De«r Mr. Black: 
Although 1do not believe it i* necessary, Mr. Aixfroa is hereby requested to immediatety exercise the 
options that you agree are due to my client This letter docs not waive my client's position and 
assertion that she is entitled to additional options as set forth in her motion, and as additional options 
as may be discovered. This tetter is not a wwvcr of any right of Ms. Andrus, including her claim for 
damages for Mr. Andna's decisions not to previously exercise his options pursuant to the Court 
Order. 
It is my understanding thai we arc exercising the stock option* for Grant Number 8405 ?S, granted 
on December 30, 1992. My client's 25% of the 9,000 shares @ $8.50 comes to a total of 
519,125,00, a check for that amount is enclosed herewith. 
Sincerely, 
BAKER & HARRIS 
M. Harris 
JMH/JG 
cc. Elizabeth Andrus 
AJva Harris 
;^AJ*DRU5\LIZ\»IYO*CTtfy^CE.5 
ADDENDUM B 
Authorization Form 
Exchange of Stock Options 
p Andrus 
y undersigned optionee hereby makes the following election regarding the exchange of stock 
options pursuant to the terms set forth in the letter dated July 1, 1997, from the Company: 
Grant 
Number 
840575 
849007 
849361 
852517 
855146 
855256 
856420 
860567 
Grant 
Date 
12/30/92 
09/07/94 
09/07/94 
06/2/95 
03/01/96 
03/01/96 
04/10/96 
11/21/96 
Number of Shares 
Outstanding 
9000 
4000 
2000 
8000 
0 
30000 
6000 
8000 
Exercise 
Price 
$8.50 
$15,375 
$15,375 
$20.00 
$0.10 
$12.1875 
$13.5 
$10.5 
Exchange for New 
Options 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
mSe*-&> 
Please sign below to acknowledge 
enclosures referenced therein and c 
the terms and conditions of the Excj 
thej^ew Grant(s) are not exercisabl 
e that participation in the ej 
em<bnt of emplayfeejit^th the 
'ag: 
dated July 1, 1997 and the. 
, you agree to be bound by all o 
Si said letter, and understand that 
nature also acknowledges that 
|stitute an express or implied 
Will basis. 
Signature of Optionee 
Tue Jul 15 11:35:14 MDT 1997 
/lA^— OremM-221 
Location 
801 222-4628 
Date Extension 
